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Abstract
The paper is devoted to inverse Stackelberg games with many players. We
consider both static and differential games. The main assumption of the paper
is the compactness of the strategy sets. We obtain the characterization of in-
verse Stackelberg solutions and under additional concavity conditions establish
the existence theorem.
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1 Introduction
The paper is devoted to the inverse Stackelberg games, also known as incentive
problems. In the ordinary Stackelberg games one player (called a leader) announces
his strategy when the other players (called followers) maximize their payoffs using
this information. In the inverse Stackelberg games the leader announces the incentive
strategy i.e. the reaction to the followers’ strategies (see [5], [6], [7], [11], [12] and
reference therein). For dynamic case the reaction should be nonanticipative.
The inverse Stackelberg games appear in several models (see for example [9], [13]).
In the games with many followers it is often assumed that followers play a Nash game
(see [2], [9], [10]). If the strategy sets are normed space then the incentive strategy
can be constructed in the affine form (see [16] for static games, and [3] for differential
games).
In this paper we consider the static and differential games with many follower.
The main assumption in the paper is the compactness of the strategy sets. In this
case the most efficient tool is discontinuous incentive strategies realizing the concept
of punishment. [8] first applied punishment strategies to the feedback differential
Stackelberg games. The inverse Stackelberg solutions of two-person differential games
were studied via punishment strategies in the paper by [1]. In that paper the authors
described the set of inverse Stackelberg solutions and showed its nonemptiness. In
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particular, the set of inverse Stackelberg payoffs is equal to the set of feedback Stack-
elberg payoffs. Note that the incentive strategies considered in the paper by [1] use
full memory, i.e. the leader plays with the nonanticipating strategies proposed in the
papers by [4], and [14] for zero-sum differential games. The usage of the strategies
depending only on the current follower’s control decreases the payoffs.
In this paper punishment strategies are applied to the static inverse Stackelberg
games and to the differential inverse Stackelberg games with many follower. We
obtain the characterization of inverse Stackelberg solution and under additional con-
cavity conditions establish the existence theorem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 starts with the two-player static
inverse Stackelberg game. Here there exists only one follower. We give the charac-
terization of the solutions in this case and compare it with the ordinary Stackelberg
solutions. Then we consider the static inverse Stackelberg game for the case of n
followers. The differential game case is considered in Section 3. In Section 4 we prove
the existence theorem for the inverse Stackelberg solution of differential game.
2 Static Games
2.1 Inverse Stackelberg Solutions for Two-player games
We assume that the set of the players is {0, 1}. Let Pi be a set of strategies of
player i; and let Ji(u1, u2) be an utility (payoff) function for player i. We assume
that the sets Pi are compact, and the functions Ji are continuous. Each player wants
to maximize his payoffs.
For definiteness let player 0 be a leader, and let player 1 be a follower. In the
inverse Stackelberg game the leader uses an incentive strategy α[u1]. Here α[·] is an
arbitrary map from P1 to P0. The information about chosen incentive strategy of the
leader is known to the follower.
Let α be a leader’s incentive strategy. We say that u∗1 is an optimal strategy of
the follower if
J1(α[u1], u1) ≤ J1(α[u
∗
1], u
∗
1).
Denote the set of optimal strategies of the follower by F(α).
Definition 1. The pair consisting of incentive strategy of the leader α∗ and the
strategy of the follower u∗1 is said to be an inverse Stackelberg solution if
1. u∗1 ∈ F(α
∗);
2. for any incentive strategy of the leader α the following inequality holds
J0(α
∗[u∗1], u
∗
1) ≥ max{J0(α[u1], u1) : u1 ∈ F(α)}.
The second conditions in particular means that we consider the team solution.
The inverse Stackelberg solution can be described by means of the lower value of
the auxiliary zero-sum game in which player 1 wishes to maximize his payoff
V − = max
u1∈P1
min
u0∈P0
J1(u0, u1). (1)
2
Let A be a set of pairs of strategies (u0, u1) such that J1(u0, u1) ≥ V
−.
Lemma 1. If u♮1 ∈ F(α), then (α[u
♮
1], u
♮
1) ∈ A.
Proof. Let uˆ1 maximize the right-hand side of (1). We have that for all u0 ∈ P0
J1(u0, uˆ1) ≥ V
−. Therefore,
J1(α[u
♮
1], u
♮
1) ≥ J1(α[uˆ1], u1) ≥ V
−.
The converse statement is also true.
Lemma 2. Let (u♮0, u
♮
1) ∈ A, then there exists an incentive strategy of the leader α
such that u♮0 = α[u
♮
1] and u
♮
1 ∈ F [α].
Proof. For u1 ∈ P1 let β[u1] ∈ Argmin{J1(u0, u1) : u0 ∈ P0}. Put
α[u1] =
{
u♮0, u1 = u
♮
1
β[u1], u1 6= u
♮
1
If u1 6= u
♮
1, then
J1(α[u1], u1) = J1(β(u1), u1) ≤ V
− ≤ J1(u
♮
0, u
♮
1) = J2(α[u
♮
1], u
♮
1).
Therefore, u♮1 ∈ F(α).
The definition of inverse Stackelberg solution and lemmas 1, 2 yield the following
Theorem.
Theorem 1. 1. If (α∗, u∗1) is an inverse Stackelberg solution, then the pair (u
∗
0, u
∗
1)
with u∗0 = α
∗[u∗1] belongs to the set A and
(u∗0, u
∗
1) ∈ Argmax{J0(u0, u1) : (u0, u1) ∈ A}. (2)
2. If the pair (u∗0, u
∗
1) ∈ A satisfies condition (2), then there exists an incentive
strategy of the leader α∗ such that u∗0 = α
∗[u∗1] and (α
∗, u∗1) is an incentive
Stackelberg solution.
3. There exists at least one inverse Stackelberg solution.
Proof. The first two statements directly follow from the definition of inverse Stackel-
berg solution and lemmas 1, 2.
The third statement follows from the second one and the compactness of A.
Now let us compare the payoffs given by inverse and ordinary Stackelberg so-
lutions. Recall the definition of the Stackelberg solution. Let F (u0) be a set of
strategies u♮1 such that u
♮
1 maximizes the function u1 7→ J1(u0, u1). The pair (u
†
0, u
†
1)
is said to be a Stackelberg solution if
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• u†1 ∈ F (u
†
0);
• J0(u
†
0, u
†
1) = max{J0(u0, u2) : u0 ∈ F (u0)}.
Note that if (u†0, u
†
1) is the Stackelberg solution then
J1(u
†
0, u
†
1) ≥ V
+ = min
u0∈P0
max
u1∈P1
J1(u0, u1).
Here V + is the upper value of the auxiliary zero-sum game; V − ≤ V +. If (u†0, u
†
1) is
a Stackelberg solution, and (α∗, u∗1) is an inverse Stackelberg solution, then
J0(u
†
0, u
†
1) ≤ J0(α
∗[u∗1], u
∗
1). (3)
Indeed, denote u∗0 = α
∗[u∗1]. By Theorem 1 we have that (u
∗
0, u
∗
1) maximizes the
value of J0 over the set A. The pair (u
†
0, u
†
1) maximizes the value of J0 over the set
{(u0, u1) : u1 ∈ F (u0)}. Inequality (3) follows from this and the inclusion
{(u0, u1) : u1 ∈ F (u0)} ⊂ {(u0, u1) ≥ V
+} ⊂ A.
The following example shows that the inequality in (3) can be strick even in the
case when V − = V +. Let J0 = u0 − u1, J1 = u0 + u1, u0, u1 ∈ [−1, 1]. We have that
V − = V + = 0. The Stackelberg solution is the pair (1, 1); J1(1, 1) = 0, J2(1, 1) = 2.
Note that the pair (1,−1) maximizes the value of J0 over the set {(u0, u1) :
u0 − u1 ≥ 0}. The inverse Stackelberg solution is the pair (α
∗,−1) with
α∗0[u1] =
{
1, u1 = −1,
−1, u1 6= −1.
Consequently, we have that in this example the inverse Stackelberg solution gives a
larger payoff than the Stackelberg solution J0(α
∗
0[−1],−1) = 2 > 0 = J0(1, 1).
2.2 Case of One Leader and Many Followers
Let player 0 be a leader, and let players 1, . . . n be followers. Player i has a set
of strategies Pi and a payoff function Ji. As above, we assume that the sets Pi are
compact, the functions Ji are continuous.
The incentive strategy of the leader is a mapping
α : ×ni=1Pi → P0.
To define the inverse Stackelberg game we should specify the solution concept used
by followers. We suppose that the followers play Nash game. Let
P = ×ni=1Pi.
An element u = (u1, . . . , un) of P is a profile of followers’ strategies. If u
′
i ∈ Pi then
(u′i, u−i) is the profile of strategies (u1, . . . , ui−1, u
′
i, ui+1, . . . , un). For simplification
we write Ji(u0, u) to denote Ji(u0, u1, . . . , un). Analogously, put Ji(u0, u
′
i, u−i) ,
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Ji(u0, (u
′
i, u−i)). If α is an incentive strategy of the leader, u is a profile of strategies
of the followers, then denote Ji[α, u] = Ji(α[u], u), Ji[α, u
′
i, u−i] = Ji[α, (u
′
i, u−i)].
Further, let E(α) be a set of followers’ Nash equilibria in the case when the leader
play with the incentive strategy α:
E(α) = {u : Ji[α, u] ≤ Ji[α, u
′
i, u−i], i = 1, n, u
′
i ∈ Pi}.
Definition 2. The pair (α∗, u∗) is an inverse Stackelberg solution in the game with
one leader and n followers playing Nash equilibrium if
1. u∗ ∈ E(α).
2.
J0[α
∗, u∗] = max
α
max
u∈E(α)
J0[α, u].
The structure of inverse Stackelberg solution is given in the following statements.
Denote
B =
{
(u♮0, u
♮) : Ji(u
♮
0, u
♮) ≥ max
ui
min
u0
Ji(u0, ui, u
♮
−i), i = 1, n
}
.
Lemma 3. 1. If u♮ ∈ E(α), then (α[u♮], u♮) ∈ B;
2. If the strategy of the leader u♮0, and the profile of the followers’ strategies u
♮ are
so that (u♮, u♮) ∈ B, then there exists an incentive strategy of the leader α such
that u♮ ∈ E(α)
The proof of this Lemma is the same as the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2.
Theorem 2. 1. If (α∗, u∗) is an inverse Stackelberg solution, then the profile of
strategies (u∗0, u
∗
1) with u
∗
0 = α
∗(u∗1) maximizes the value J0(u
∗
0, u
∗
1) over the set
B.
2. If profile of strategies (u∗0, u
∗
1) maximizes the value J0(u
∗
0, u
∗
1) over the set B then
there exists an incentive strategy α∗ such that α∗[u∗1] = u
∗
0 and (α
∗, u∗1) is an
inverse Stackelberg solution.
3. If the function u′i 7→ Ji(u0, u
′
i, u−i) is quasiconcave for all u0, u−i, and i =
1, . . . , n, then there exists at least one inverse Stackelberg solutions.
Proof. The proof of the first two statements directly follows from Lemma 3.
Let us prove the third statement of the Theorem. Define
Ki(u1, . . . , un) = min
u0∈P0
Ji(u0, u1, . . . , ui).
The functions u′i 7→ Ki(u
′
i, u−i) are quasiconcave for all u−i. Therefore there exists a
profile of followers’ strategies u♮ such that for all ui ∈ Pi Ki(u
♮) ≥ Ki(ui, u
♮
−i). Hence,
we have that any pair (u0, u
♮) belongs to B. Consequently, B is nonempty. Moreover,
the set B is compact. This prove the existence of the pair (u∗0, u
∗) maximizing J0
over the set B. The existence of inverse Stackelberg solution directly follows from the
second statement of the Theorem.
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3 Inverse Stackelberg Solution for Differential
Games
As above we assume that player 0 is a leader, when players 1, . . . , n are followers.
The dynamics of the system is given by the equation
x˙ = f(t, x, u0, u1, . . . , un), t ∈ [0, T ], x ∈ R
d, x(0) = x0, ui ∈ Pi. (4)
Player i wishes to maximize the payoff
σi(x(T )) +
∫ T
0
gi(t, x, u0, u1, . . . , un)dt.
The set
Ui = {ui : [0, T ]→ Pi measurable}
is the set of open-loop strategies of player i. As above the n-tuple of open-loop
strategies of followers u = (u1, . . . , un) is called the profile of strategies. For notational
simplicity denote
f(t, x, u0, u) = f(t, x, u0, u1, . . . , un), g(t, x, u0, u) = g(t, x, u0, u1, . . . , un).
Further, put
U = ×ni=1Ui.
If u0 ∈ U0, u = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ U , (t∗, x∗) ∈ [0, T ]×R
n, then denote by x(·, t∗, x∗, u0, u)
the solution of initial value problem
x˙(t) = f(t, x(t), u0(t), u1(t), . . . , un(t)), x(t∗) = x∗.
Put
zi(t, t∗, x∗, u0, u) =
∫ t
t∗
gi(t, x(t), u0(t), u1(t), . . . , un(t))dt.
If t∗ = 0, x∗ = x0 we omit the arguments t∗ and x∗. Let z(·, t∗, x∗, u0, u) =
(z0(·, t∗, x∗, u0, u), z1(·, t∗, x∗, u0, u), . . . , zn(·, t∗, x∗, u0, u)). We assume that the set of
motions is closed i.e. for all (t∗, x∗) ∈ [0, T ]× R
n
cl{(x(·, t∗, x∗, u0, u), z(·, t∗, x∗, u0, u)) : u0 ∈ U0, u ∈ U}
= {(x(·, t∗, x∗, u0, u), z(·, t∗, x∗, u0, u)) : u0 ∈ U0, u ∈ U}.
Here cl denote closure in space of continuous functions on [0, T ].
We assume that the followers use the open-loop strategies ui ∈ Ui, when the
leader’s strategy is a nonanticipative strategy α : U → U0. The nonanticipation
property means that α[u](τ) = α[u′](τ) for any u and u′ coinciding on [0, τ ].
For u0 ∈ U0, u ∈ U , (t∗, x∗) define
Ji(t∗, x∗, u0, u) = σi(x(T, t∗, x∗, u0, u)) + zi(T, t∗, x∗, u0, u).
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Further, put
Ji[t∗, x∗, α, u] = Ji(t∗, x∗, α(u), u).
We omit the arguments t∗ and x∗ if t∗ = 0, x∗ = x0.
We assume that the followers’ solution concept is Nash equilibrium. Let Ed(α) de-
note the set of Nash equilibria in the case when the leader plays with nonanticipating
strategy α:
Ed(α) = {u ∈ U : Ji[α, u] ≥ Ji[α, u
′
i, u−i] for all u
′
i ∈ Ui}.
Definition 3. The pair consisting of nonanticipative strategy of the leader α∗ and
u∗ ∈ U is an inverse Stckelberg solution of the differential game if
• u∗ ∈ Ed(α
∗)
•
J0[α
∗, u∗] = max
α
max
u∈Ed(α)
J0[α, u].
The proposed definition is analogous to the definition of inverse Stackelberg so-
lution for static games. The characterization in the differential game case is close to
the characterization in the static game case also.
For a fixed profile of strategies of all players but i-th one u−i one can consider the
zero-sum differential game of player 0 and player i. The lower value of this game is
V −i (t∗, x∗, u−i) = min
α
max
u′
i
∈Ui
Ji[t∗, x∗, α, u
′
i, u−i].
Let
C = {(u0, u) ∈ U0 × U :
Ji(t, x(t), u0, u) ≥ V
−
i (t, x(t), u−i), x(·) = x(·, u0, u), t ∈ [0, T ]}.
Lemma 4. Let α be an incentive strategy of the leader. If u♮ ∈ Ed(α) then (α[u
♮], u♮) ∈
C.
Proof. We claim that
Ji[t, x
♮(t), u♮0, u
♮] ≥ Ji[t, x
♮(t), α[u′i, u
♮
−i], u
′
i, u
♮
−i] (5)
for any u′i ∈ Ui, u
♮
0 = α(u
∗), x♮ = x(·, α[u∗], u♮). Assume the converse. This means
that for some u′i and τ
Ji[τ, x
♮(τ), u♮0, u
♮] < Ji[τ, x
♮(τ), α[u′i, u
♮
−i], u
′
i, u
♮
−i].
Consider the control
u♭i =
{
u♮i(t), t ∈ [0, τ ]
u′i(t), t ∈ [τ, T ].
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Denote u♭0 = α[u
♭
i, u
♮
−i], x
♭(·) = x(·, u♭0, (u
♭
i, u
♮
−i)). We have that
Ji[α, u
♭
i, u
♮
−i] = σ(x
♭(T )) +
∫ T
0
g(t, x♭(t), u♭0, (u
♭
i, u
♮
−i))dt.
Since for t ∈ [0, τ ] u♭i(t) = u
♮
i(t), u
♭
0 = u
♮
0(t) = α[u
♮](t), x♭(t) = x♮(t), and for t ∈ [τ, T ]
x♭(t) = x(t, τ, x♮(τ), u♭0, (u
♭
i, u
♮
−i)) the following inequality holds
Ji[α, u
♭
i, u
♮
−i] >
∫ τ
0
gi(t, x
♮(t), u♮0, u
♮)dt+ J [τ, x♮(τ), α, u♮] = J [α, u♮].
This contradicts with the assumption u♮ ∈ Ed(α).
The inequality (5) yields the inequality Ji[t, x
♮(t), u♮0, u
♮] ≥ V −i (t, x
♮(t), u♮−i).
Lemma 5. For any (u♮0, u
♮) ∈ C there exists a nonanticipative strategy of the leader
α so that α(u♮) = u♮0 and u
♮ ∈ Ed(α).
Proof. Let ui ∈ U , and let τi be the greatest time so that ui = u
♮
i on [0, τi]. Denote
ξi = x(t, u
♮
0, (ui, u
♮
−i)). There exists a nonanticipative strategy of the leader ατi such
that
Vi(τi, ξi, u
♮
−i) = max
ui
J [τi, ξi, ατi, ui, u
♮
−i].
Let α∗ be a nonanticipative strategy of the leader so that
α∗[ui, u
♮
−i](t) =
{
u♮0(t), t ∈ [0, τ ]
ατi(ui), t ∈ [τ, T ].
We have that α∗[u♮] = u♮0. Moreover, for any ui ∈ Ui Ji[α, ui, u
♮
−i] = Vi(τi, ξi, u
♮
−i) ≤
Ji[α, u
♮].
Theorem 3. 1. If the pair (α∗, u∗) is an inverse Stackelberg solution then
(u∗0, u
∗) ∈ C and (u∗0, u
∗
1) maximizes the value J0 over the set C for u
∗
0 = α
∗[u∗].
2. Conversely, if the pair (u∗0, u
∗
1) maximizes the value J0 over the set C then there
exists an incentive strategy of the leader α∗ such that α∗[u∗1] = u
∗
0 and (α
∗, u∗1)
is an incentive Stackelberg solution.
The Theorem directly follows from Lemmas 4, 5.
4 Existence of Inverse Stackelberg Solution for
Differential Game
In this section we consider the differential game in the mixed strategies. This
means that we replace the system (4) with the control system described by the equa-
tion
x˙(t) =
∫
P0
∫
P1
. . .
∫
Pn
f(t, x(t), u0, u1, . . . , un)µn(t, dun) . . . µ1(t, du1)µ0(t, du0). (6)
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Here µi(t, ·) are probabilistic measures on Pi. We denote the solution of initial value
problem for equation (6) and the position (t∗, x∗) by x(·, t∗, x∗, µ0, µ1, . . . , µn). Fur-
ther, let Mi be a set of function µi(t, dui) such that for all t µi(t, ·) is a probabilistic
measure on Pi and t 7→ µ(t, ·) is weakly measurable i.e.
t 7→
∫
Pi
φ(ui)µ(t, dui)
is measurable for any continuous function ϕ.
As above we call the n-tuple µ = (µ1, . . . , µn) the profile of followers’ mixed
strategies. Denote the set of followers’ strategies by M. Put x(·, t∗, x∗, µ0, µ) =
x(·, t∗, x∗, µ0, µ1, . . . , µn), x(·, t∗, x∗, µ0, µ
′
i, µ−i) = x(·, t∗, x∗, µ0, (µ
′
i, µ−i)).
Further denote
P−i = ×j 6=iPj.
If m = (m1, . . . , mn) ∈ M then denote with a slight abuse of notation m(du) =
m1(du1) . . .mndun. Further, ∫
P
ϕ(u)m(du)
means the integral by the measure m1(du1) . . .mn(dun) over the set P = P1×. . .×Pn.
Analogously, if m−i is a (n − 1)-tuple of measures (mj)j 6=i then we assume that
m−i(du−i) , ×j 6=imj(duj). Thus,
∫
P−i
ϕ(u−i)m−i(du−i)
designates the integral by the measure ×j 6=imj(duj) over the set P−i.
For the given position (t∗, x∗) ∈ [0, T ]× R
n, and measures µ0 ∈ M0, µ ∈ M the
corresponding payoff of player i is equal to
Ji(t∗, x∗, µ0, µ) = σi(x(T, t∗, x∗, µ0, µ))
+
∫ T
t∗
∫
P0
∫
P
gi(t, x(t, t∗, x∗, µ0, µ), u0, u)µ0(t, du0)µ(t, du)dt.
As above the mapping α : M → M0 satisfying condition of feasibility (the
equality µ′ and µ′′ on [0, τ ] yields the equality α[µ′](t, ·) = α[µ′′](t, ·) on [0, τ ]) is
called nonanticipative strategy.
Theorem 4. Assume that the following conditions hold true for each i = 1, n
1. x 7→ σi(x) is concave;
2. gi(t, x, u0, u) = g
0
i (t, x, u−i) + g
1
i (t, u0, u−i) + g
2
i (t, u) and the function
x 7→ g0i (t, x, u−i) is concave.
Then there exists an inverse Stackelberg solution in mixed strategies (α∗, µ∗).
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Proof. Let us prove that the set C is nonempty.
Since the players use mixed strategies the Isaacs condition holds for each i = 1, n
i.e. for all profile of measures m−i and any vector s ∈ R
d the following equality is
valid
min
m0
max
mi
∫
P0
∫
Pi
∫
P−i
[〈s, f(t, x, u0, u1, . . . , un)〉+ gi(t, x, u0, u1, . . . , un)]
m−i(du−i)mi(dui)m0(du0)
= max
mi
min
m0
∫
P0
∫
Pi
∫
P−i
[〈s, f(t, x, u0, u1, . . . , un)〉+ gi(t, x, u0, u1, . . . , un)]
m−i(du−i)mi(dui)m0(du0).
Therefore
V −(t∗, x∗, µ−i) = V
+(t∗, x∗, µ−i) = max
βi
min
µ0∈M0
Ji(t∗, x∗, µ0, βi[µ0], µ−i).
Here βi denotes a mapping M0 →Mi satisfying feasibility property.
Define the multivalued map G : M0 × M ⊸ M0 × M by the rule (µ
′
0, µ
′) ∈
G(µ0, µ) if for each i = 1, n
Ji(t, xi(t), µ
′
0, µ
′
i, µ−i) ≥ V
−
i (t, xi(t), µ−i).
Here xi(·) = x(·, µ
′
0, µ
′
i, µ−i).
Note that the set G(µ0, µ) is convex for all µ0 ∈ M0, µ ∈ M. Moreover, G has a
closed graph. Let us prove the nonemptiness of G(µ0, µ).
Put µ′0 = µ0. From Bellman principle it follows that
V +i (t∗, x∗, µ−i) = max
βi
min
µ0∈M0
[
V (t+, x(t+, t∗, x∗, µ0, βi[µ−i], µ−i))
+
∫ t+
t∗
∫
P0
∫
Pi
∫
P−i
gi(t, x(t+, t∗, x∗, µ0, βi(µ−i), µ−i)), u0, u−i, u−i)
µ−i(t, du−i)βi[µ0](t, dui)µ0(t, du0)dt
]
. (7)
Let N be a natural number. Put tkN = Tk/N . Let β
k
i,N maximize the right-hand side
at (7) for t∗ = t
k
N , t+ = t
k+1
N , x∗ = ξ
k−1
i,N . Here ξ
k
i,N is defined inductively by the rule
ξ0i,N = x0, ξ
k
i,N = x(t
k
i,N , t
k−1
i,N , ξ
k−1
i,N , µ0, β
k−1
i,N [µ0], µ−i).
Put µ˜i,N(t, ·) = β
k
i,N [µ0](t, ·) for t ∈ [t
k−1
N , t
k
N). Denote xi,N(·) =
x(·, t0, x0, µ0, µ˜i,N , µ−i). Note that ξ
k
i,N = xi,N(t
k
N). We have for k < l the inequality
V +i (t
k
N , xi,N(t
k
N), µ−i) ≤ V
+
i (t
l
N , xi,N(t
l
N ), µ−i)
+
∫ tl
N
tk
N
∫
P0
∫
Pi
∫
P−i
gi(t, xi,N (t), u0, ui, u−i)µ−i(t, du−i)µi(t, dui)µ0(t, du0)dt
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Note that V +i (t
N
N , ξ
N
i,N , µ−i) = σi(ξ
N
i,N).
Using the continuity of the function V +i we get that
V +i (t∗, xi,N(t∗), µ−i) ≤ V
+
i (T, xi,N (T ), µ−i)
+
∫ T
t∗
∫
P0
∫
Pi
∫
P−i
gi(t, xi,N(t), u0, ui, u−i)µ−i(t, du−i)µi(t, dui)µ0(t, du0)dt+ δN . (8)
Here δN → 0, as N →∞.
There exists a sequence {µ˜i,Nr} converging to some µ
′
i ∈Mi, as r →∞. Therefore
xi,Nr(·) = x(·, t0, x0, µ0, µ˜i,Nr , µ−i) tends to xi(·) = x(·, t0, x0, µ0, µ
′
i, µ−i). This and
inequality (8) yield the inequality
V +i (t∗, xi(t∗), µ−i) ≤ V
+
i (T, xi(T ), µ−i)
+
∫ T
t∗
∫
P0
∫
Pi
∫
P−i
gi(t, xi(t), u0, ui, u−i)µ−i(t, du−i)µi(t, dui)µ0(t, du0)dt.
Consider the profile of followers’ strategies µ′ = (µ′1, . . . , µ
′
n). We have that
(µ0, µ
′) ∈ G(µ0, µ).
Since M0 ×M is compact, and G is an upper semicontinuous multivalued map
with nonempty convex compact values, we get that G admits the fixed point (µ∗0, µ
∗).
Obviously, it belongs to C. The consequence of the Theorem follows from this and
Theorem 3.
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